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transfer
Ainsley J Newson1, Stephen Wilkinson2 & Anthony Wrigley3
The US National Academies of Science,
Engineering and Medicine recently
provided conditional endorsement for
mitochondrial transfer. While its approach
is more conservative in some respects
than that of the United Kingdom (which
passed its own regulations in 2015), it
marks a significant policy development for
a potentially large implementer of this
emerging intervention. In this perspective,
we consider some of the ethical and legal
aspects of these policy responses.
Ethical and legal issues in
mitochondrial transfer
Mitochondrial transfer (MT) techniques are
being developed as one method of enabling
at-risk couples to avoid having a child with
mitochondrial disease (Richardson et al,
2015). These conditions can affect multiple
organ systems, are often debilitating and
life-shortening and at present cannot be
cured.
Two main MT techniques are proposed:
maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pronu-
clear transfer (PNT) (Richardson et al, 2015).
MST is undertaken in oocytes and involves
removing the spindle from an oocyte with
affected mitochondria and inserting it into an
enucleated donor oocyte, which then under-
goes in vitro fertilisation. PNT involves creat-
ing an embryo using the intended parents’
gametes and removing the pronuclei. This is
then transferred into an early embryo created
using the intended father’s sperm and a
donor oocyte and allowed to develop.
MT raises conceptual, ethical and legal
issues (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2012).
As well as the fundamental question of
whether it should be allowed at all, these
technologies raise more specific questions.
Should they be categorised as a germline
genetic modification? Should only male
embryos be implanted? Do the children
created have a right to know who the oocyte
donor was? And what legal liabilities would
and should ensue? Each of these is discussed
below.
What’s in a name?
Nomenclature in relation to emerging
biotechnologies often occurs haphazardly,
or is bestowed by those who may not be key
to its development. This is unfortunate, as
the connotations of a particular term may
adversely affect subsequent ethical, public
and policy debates (Ravitsky et al, 2015).
Interventions to alter mitochondria in
embryos are beset by multiple names, most
of which have misleading connotations. To
date, the MT technologies described above
have been termed “mitochondrial donation”,
“mitochondrial replacement”, “mitochon-
drial therapy”, “mitochondrial transfer” and
“three-parent IVF”. Here, we use “mitochon-
drial transfer” as the most accurate and
normatively “neutral” term, albeit recognis-
ing that this is an imperfect descriptor given
some aspects of MT technologies.
Regulatory activity and
policy development
The United Kingdom (UK) was the first
country actively to regulate MT; passing
regulations that came into force on October
31, 2015 (The Human Fertilisation and
Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regu-
lations 2015 No. 572). The UK regulations
allow clinical use of MT under licence. No
licence applications have yet been received,
although one is expected soon.
An important policy development also
occurred in the United States in February
2016 when a specially constituted committee
of the National Academies of Science, Engi-
neering and Medicine (NASEM) sanctioned
a slightly narrower use of MT than that regu-
lated in the UK. NASEM recommended that
“mitochondrial replacement techniques”
should be considered for clinical implemen-
tation, subject to certain conditions, includ-
ing that only male embryos should be
implanted (NASEM, 2016).
These regulatory developments should
also be considered in the light of the distinct
approaches to regulation of reproductive
technologies in these jurisdictions (Ouellette
et al, 2005). The United Kingdom tightly
regulates clinics providing assisted repro-
ductive services and novel reproductive
technologies. The United States, in contrast,
takes a more laissez-faire approach, which
some claim is due to certain constitutional
rights. This relative lack of regulation may
be one reason why the NASEM report
provides detailed recommendations as to the
clinical implementation of MT.
Genetically modified children? Ethical
and legal implications
MT raises ethical and conceptual concerns
over whether it is a form of germline gene
therapy, and whether children born follow-
ing MT are genetically modified. Unlike
somatic therapies, germline modifications
are not usually permitted due to the
perceived risks for future generations. In
response, we may ask both how MT should
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be classified and whether modifying the
germline is always wrong.
There is as yet no consensus as to
whether MT is a genetic modification or
germline gene therapy, although key distinc-
tions have been emphasised. First, germline
therapies usually target nuclear DNA,
whereas MT targets whole mitochondria
outside the nucleus. Second, the trans-
planted mitochondria will only be heritable
matrilineally and therefore will not be
passed onto male offspring. This can be
termed the “quasi-heritability” of MT.
This lack of agreement over MT’s status
can also be observed in policy. Both UK poli-
cymakers and the NASEM report accept that
MT technology is a form of heritable modifi-
cation. But while key UK policy reports
accept that MT has germline implications,
they reject MT as a “genetic modification”—
a unique policy turn—on the grounds that
their working definition of what constitutes
a “genetic modification” involves the herita-
ble modification of only nuclear DNA
(Public Health Directorate, 2014).
The NASEM report, in contrast, distin-
guishes between “genetic modification” and
“germline modification” (NASEM, 2016, sect
3). NASEM considers genetic modification to
be “changes to the genetic material within a
cell” and germline modification to be
“human inheritable genetic modification”.
This distinction allows them to claim that:
“MRT [MT] involves genetic modification,
but that it constitutes. . .germline modifi-
cation. . . only if used to produce female
offspring” (NASEM, 2016, sect 3, p. 8).
Whether MT is a form of genetic modifi-
cation depends both on how we define
“genetic modification” and on the attributes
of the specific MT technology employed.
While MT would constitute a form of
genetic modification under almost every
current definition, whether it can always be
classified as a germline gene therapy or
whether it is classifiable as some other
form of intervention is both a matter of
recent debate and something that may have
subsequent ethical implications for its use
(Wrigley et al, 2015).
Sex selection
One notable point of divergence between the
British and American policy approaches is
that while the NASEM Report recommends
“restricting initial first-in-human clinical
investigations to male embryos” (NASEM,
2016, sect 4, p. 6), the UK has rejected such
an approach.
NASEM’s main argument for this restric-
tion is that, because mitochondrial inheri-
tance is matrilineal, using only male
embryos stops MT from being a “germline”
genetic modification with its attendant (but
theoretical) risks to future generations. The
UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA), however, argued against
a “male embryos only” policy on the
grounds that “using sex selection after mito-
chondrial replacement would expose the
embryos to additional intervention”, which
might generate extra risk (HFEA, 2013,
s.6.19). The UK Government also accepted
the safety of all MT, regardless of the biolog-
ical sex of the children who may be born.
The difference between NASEM and
HFEA is therefore less about the ethics of
sex selection per se than about weighing dif-
ferent kinds of risk. The HFEA has chosen to
prioritise avoiding perceived short-term risks
to the first generation of children created
(citing concerns about the extra biopsy
needed for sex selection), whereas NASEM
places greater emphasis on what it sees as
longer-term risks to the “gene pool”.
Another risk that should be counte-
nanced—mentioned by neither the HFEA
nor NASEM—is the risk of IVF failure (and
thus more invasive interventions for women
participating in MT) if the pool of “suitable”
embryos is reduced by half, to male embryos
only.
Donor anonymity
Many jurisdictions give the genetic offspring
of egg and sperm donors a right to identify-
ing information about those donors. MT
then raises the question of whether children
born from its use should have similar rights.
This has sometimes been couched in terms
of whether egg donors for MT are more like
“regular” gamete donors, or blood or organ
donors. The HFEA, for example, has advised
that “mitochondria donors should have a
similar status to that of tissue donors”
(HFEA, 2013, s.6.64).
Some of the supposed differences
between mitochondrial egg donors and
“regular” egg donors—which may justify
not giving MT-conceived children a right to
know—are as follows. First, in “regular”
gamete donation, the offspring are quite
likely to resemble the donor in noticeable
ways; this is not the case for mitochondrial
transfer. Second, nuclear DNA is said to be
constitutive of a person’s genetic identity in
ways that mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is
not. In addition, “the child’s sense of self
would be inherited from their [social]
parents” (HFEA, 2013, s.6.49).
Third, it might be argued that non-disclo-
sure of origins in “regular” gamete donation
is more likely to involve serious deception
than for mitochondrial transfer. In MT, the
child will often be raised by its two main
genetic parents; so if the child is not fully
informed about its MT origins, it merely fails
to know about an extra person’s contribu-
tion. However, when “regular” donor-
conceived individuals are not informed, this
may involve “passing off” one of its social
parents as a genetic parent.
Against this, however, it may be argued
that the role mtDNA plays in determining our
physical development is uncertain and that
there may therefore be a precautionary case
for granting a right to know: just in case it
turns out that mtDNA has a greater role
biologically than we thought; or just in case it
turns out that MT-conceived children have a
strong desire to know who their donor was.
One further reason to allow a right to
know is that anonymous donation overlooks
the role of oocyte donors (Haimes & Taylor,
2015). The process of donation and the risks
that ensue is the same for MT as it is
for “regular” donation. Rendering donation
anonymous could therefore be said to under-
value this contribution.
Legal risks?
While a comprehensive comparison of
global legal regulation for MT is beyond the
scope of this article, determining sound legal
responses to MT and its possible harms
remain live issues.
MT’s potential risks may cause us to
wonder about any liability for those who
provide it. There are, for example, ongoing
tensions in the literature around interactions
between mitochondrial and nuclear DNA,
and “contamination” by residual mitochon-
dria (Hamilton, 2015).
If (and it is a “big if”) these risks tran-
spire, might this lead to claims for compen-
sation against those providing the
technology? Could a child born with sub-
optimal health as a result of MT successfully
bring an action against those who provided
the treatment? The answer, in many jurisdic-
tions, is “unlikely” for three main reasons.
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First, in countries with common law legal
systems, most claims like this—so-called
wrongful life claims—tend to fail because of
difficulties in making the particular circum-
stances fit the elements of a cause of action
in negligence. This includes the need for the
person to show that they have been so badly
harmed that they would be better off not
having been born. The standard of care for
MT is also not yet established, as it is experi-
mental. An action in negligence has little to
do with a particular jurisdiction’s regulatory
approach; rather, it involves (amongst other
things) comparing the delivery of a treat-
ment against an established standard.
Second, some types of MT might actually
lead to a different person being born alto-
gether; such that no harm is done to a
particular person (Wrigley et al, 2015). This
issue arises from philosophical reflection
upon the nature of harms and wrongful life
claims. For an individual to claim to have
been harmed by coming into existence, they
would have to show that they were worse
off as a result of MT. But with some MT
techniques, the intervention happens prior
to fertilisation. If MT had not taken place, an
entirely different person would have been
born. Thus, the child claiming harm from
MT would not have existed and cannot
claim to have been harmed by its use.
Third, the experimental nature of this
intervention differentiates MT from many
other wrongful life decisions. Any legal claim
would presumably not be about a test being
done incorrectly, or a diagnosis missed.
Instead, it is the technology itself that may
be risky or imperfect no matter how well it is
applied. If a couple has received appropriate
counselling as to these risks and is still
prepared to go ahead, then the resulting
child would be unlikely to have an action
against the treating health professional.
Ethics and the future of
human reproduction
Mitochondrial transfer raises a challenging
range of ethical and regulatory questions
and, as it is rolled out into clinical practice,
more are sure to emerge. It also encourages
us to revisit more familiar ideas such as
“germline genetic modification”, to ask
whether such modifications are always
wrong, and to consider whether the concept
itself is “fit for purpose”. MT similarly
makes us think anew about the basis on
which donor-conceived people are given a
right to know their biological origins and
about who else should have this right. While
some such issues are new, many of them are
not unique to MT and similar questions are
already being asked about other develop-
ments in human reproduction, such as
in vitro generated (“artificial”) gametes and
uterus transplants (Newson & Smajdor,
2005; Catsanos et al, 2013; Wilkinson &
Williams, 2015). Our ethical and regulatory
responses to emerging reproductive tech-
nologies need to deal with a wider range of
issues than ever before.
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